Archive for February, 2009

La Nausee

February 14, 2009

Antoine Roquentin, célibataire d’environ trente-cinq ans, vit seul à Bouville, cité imaginaire qui rappelle le Havre. Il travaille à un ouvrage sur la vie du marquis de Rollebon, aristocrate de la fin du XVIIIe siècle, et vit de ses rentes, après avoir abandonné un emploi en Indochine, par lassitude des voyages et de ce qu’il avait cru être l’aventure. Il tient son journal, et c’est le texte de ce journal qui constitue le roman, écrit à la première personne. Il constate que son rapport aux objets ordinaires a changé et il se demande en quoi. Tout lui semble désagréable. Il n’a plus d’affection pour personne. Il rencontre l’Autodidacte à la bibliothèque. Roquentin sent un profond éloignement avec tout ce qui l’entoure. Il ne supporte plus la bourgeoisie de Bouville, M. de Rollebon lui semble vite bien terne et sans intérêt, aussi arrête-t-il son livre. Il veut tout quitter puis se dit que seul l’imaginaire parviendra peut-être à l’arracher à la Nausée et l’écriture d’un roman l’aiderait peut être à accepter l’existence.

Élaboration

Le roman intitulé La Nausée est le fruit d’un long parcours et d’une longue élaboration de huit années. Parti d’une approche philosophique de la conscience et de la contingence, le jeune professeur alors en poste au Havre élabore le projet d’un « factum », d’une analyse agressive d’une approche philosophique, qui se transforme en œuvre romanesque sous l’influence des lectures de Céline[1], de Kafka ou de Queneau. Il approfondit également l’aspect philosophique de l’œuvre en étudiant de près Husserl et la phénoménologie allemande, en particulier durant son séjour d’ une année à la Maison Académique française de Berlin en 1933-1934, séjour qui le laissera cependant aveugle à la réalité du nazisme. Il rédige plusieurs versions successives annotées par Simone de Beauvoir mais le livre est refusé par les éditions Gallimard en 1936 malgré l’aide de Paul Nizan. Il reprend son texte qui est finalement accepté au printemps 1937. Il devra cependant encore le modifier pour gommer certains passages « un peu libres » (c’est son expression) et supprimer une quarantaine de pages. Le titre initial choisi par Jean-Paul Sartre était Melancholia, sans doute par référence à Dürer, mais Gaston Gallimard propose et impose le titre définitif La Nausée : l’ouvrage paraît en avril 1938 et est salué par l’ensemble du monde des lettres.

Advertisements

Confucius: Who was he?

February 5, 2009

Confucius (kənfy`shəs), Chinese K’ung Ch’iu or K’ung Fu-tzu [Master K’ung], c.551–479? B.C., Chinese sage. Positive evidence concerning the life of Confucius is scanty; modern scholars base their accounts largely on the Analects, a collection of sayings and short dialogues apparently collected by his disciples, and discard most of the later legends. Confucius was born in the feudal state of Lu, in modern Shandong prov. Distressed by the constant warfare between the Chinese states and by the venality and tyranny of the rulers, he urged a system of morality and statecraft that would preserve peace and provide people with stable and just government. He gathered about him a number of disciples, some occupying high positions, although Confucius himself was at most granted an insignificant sinecure, possibly because of his extremely outspoken manner toward his superiors. From about his 55th to his 65th year he journeyed to several neighboring states, but he was never able to induce any ruler to grant him high office so that he might introduce his reforms. Later tradition depicts Confucius as a man who made special study of ancient books, in an effort to restore an older social order. It is said that he was a minister of state and the author, editor, or compiler of the Wu Ching [five classics] (see Chinese literature Chinese literature, the literature of ancient and modern China.

Early Writing and Literature

It is not known when the current system of writing Chinese first developed. The oldest written records date from about 1400 B.C.

Confucius (551-479 BC)

Chinese sage whose name is given to the ethical system of Confucianism. He placed emphasis on moral order and observance of the established patriarchal family and social relationships of authority, obedience, and mutual respect. His emphasis on tradition and ethics attracted a growing number of pupils during his lifetime. The Analects of Confucius, a compilation of his teachings, was published after his death.

Confucius was born in Lu, in what is now the province of Shangdong, and his early years were spent in poverty. Married at the age of 19, he worked as a minor official, then as a teacher. In 517 there was an uprising in Lu, and Confucius spent the next year or two in the adjoining state of Ch’i. As a teacher he was able to place many of his pupils in government posts but a powerful position eluded him. Only in his fifties was he given an office, but he soon resigned because of the lack of power it conveyed. Then for 14 years he wandered from state to state looking for a ruler who could give him a post where he could put into practice his ideas for relieving suffering among the poor. At the age of 67 he returned to Lu and devoted himself to teaching. At his death five years later he was buried with great pomp, and his grave outside Qufu has remained a centre of pilgrimage. Within 300 years of his death, his teaching was adopted by the Chinese state.


Max Scheler (1874-1928)

February 5, 2009

Scheler, Max (1874-1928) was originally a disciple of Rudolf Eucken, but joined early — at the University of Munich — the Husserl circle of phenomenologists, of which school he became one of the leading exponents. Moving from Kantianism and Eucken-personalism into phenomenology, he later espoused successively positions which may be called a synthesis between phenomenology and Catholic philosophy, sociological dynamism, and ideo-realistic humanism. He was the psychologist, ethicist, and religious and social philosopher of the phenomenological movement. In common with other phenomenologists, Scheler’s doctrine begins with the assertion of an inherent correlation of the essences of objects with the essences of intentional experience. His unique contributions lie in the comprehensiveness of his vision, in his interpretation of the value-qualities of being; of emotional experience, especially love, as the key for the disclosure of being; of a hierarchy of concrete (“material” as against formal) values; of an analysis of “resentment” as a thorough grudge (rancour) perverted emotional attitude towards the values of life; of his definition of “person” as the concrete unity of acts; of his acknowledgment of total personality beyond individual persons; of his definition of “ethos” as a preferential system of values determinative for the validity of any specific thought-form; of his development of the sociology of knowledge as a distinct discipline within cultural sociology; and of his working out of a philosophical anthropology showing man’s position in and towards the whole of being. His most important works include:

Die transzendentale und die psychologische Methode (1900);
Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (1916);
Vom Ewigen in Menschen (1921); Wesen und Formen der Sympathie (1923);
Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre (3 vols., 1923-1924);
Die Wissensformen und dte Gesellschaft (1926);
Die Stellung des Menschen in Kosmos (1928);
Philosophische Weltanschauung (1929);
Zur Ethik und Erkenntnislehre (1933).

Hylemorphism and Modern Science

February 5, 2009

Thomas Aquinas wrote two books: De Principiis Naturae (circa 1252) and De Mixione Elementorum (1273), where he discusses the question of the composition of natural things or physical substances  (whether out of matter and form, or out of the elements). The object of the De Principiis Naturae is to account for generation, that is, the process through which all natural things are brought into existence. Aquinas identifies three principles: matter, form, and privation. Form, the actuality of matter, is a per se principle that is found only in the terminus ad quem of generation. As such, it is a differentiating principle which must be distinguished from the “essence,” for whereas the substantial form differentiates the end term of a radical change from the beginning term, the essence differentiates the end term from nothingness”. It is not the form itself which has existence, it is the composite which exists “through the form” . A form never comes to be as a subsisting thing but only as that by which the subsisting thing subsists. Forms are “educed” (eductae) from the potency of the elements into the actuality of the composite. Eduction (by contrast with generation or creation) designates the potentiality of already informed matter to receive a new substantial form. Matter and privation, on the other hand, are found together in the terminus a quo, for what can be (matter) is not what it can become (privation). Privation (a principle per accidens) is not, however, mere nothingness (otherwise we would have creation, not generation) but determinate non-being; the non-being of that which is in potency, a non-being which is as well as a being which is not” . This is why the matter which is found together with privation cannot be prime matter but determinate elemental matter. Finally, privation leads Aquinas to distinguish principles from causes along the distinction of generation and existence. Form and matter are both principles and causes because both are intrinsic causes of the “existing” substance. Yet whereas all causes are principles, all principles are not causes, for privation does not account for the existence but for the “coming to be” of substance.

The De Mixione Elementorum answers the question: “how do elements remain in a mixed body?” . Elements are natural bodies indivisible into species diverse from their own. As such, they are not only material but also efficient causes. The elements cannot remain with their substantial form in a mixed body, for otherwise such a body would rather be a juxtaposition of substances. Since a mixed body differs in kind from its constituents, it must have a substantial form of its own. Aquinas’ resolution is that the elements remain with respect to power, not with respect to their forms. A complex body is a mixio in which the qualities of the elements affect and alter each other so as to remain virtually (that is, as retrievable powers) but not actually (without a corresponding substantial form).

We can draw a parallel with modern physics. For a time, modern physics was thought of as atomistic, thus unable to accept the idea of mixio, as Aristotle and Aquinas understood it. In a chemical combination for instance, the elements were thought to remain intact at the atomic level. This view is now challenged, however, and science must make room for a conception of both the elements and the mixed bodies. The quarks, which survive in a proton, do not retain their substantial form–they have been corrupted with respect to what they actually are, as determined by their substantial forms. But they have not been corrupted with respect to what they can actually do, i.e. with respect to their powers. Further, we can propose an analogy between the concept of prima materia and neutrinos (the electron neutrino is understood as having no electric charge, no strong force, no spatial extent, no electromagnetic force, and possibly no mass).

We should avoid a common misrepresentation, namely that (1) hylemorphic composition is not to be understood as a juxtaposition of preexisting and unrelated principles (matter and form) but that (2) hylemorphism can account for the unity of natural substances, and (3) reconcile this unity with the reality of the autonomous movement of nature toward its end.

Avicenna (Ibn Sina)

February 5, 2009

Biography

IBN SINA, Abu Ali al-Hussain Ibn Abdullah Ibn Sina, known in the West as Avicenna. He followed the encyclopedic conception of the sciences that had been traditional since the time of the Greek Sages in uniting philosophy with the study of nature and in seeing the perfection of man as lying in both knowledge and action. He was also as illustrious a physician as he was a philosopher.

His life is known to us from authoritative sources. An autobiography covers his first thirty years, and the rest are documented by his disciple al-Juzajani, who was also his secretary and his friend.

He was born in 370/980 in Afshana, his mother’s home, near Bukhara. His native language was Persian. His father, an official of the Samanid administration, had him very carefully educated at Bukhara. His father and his brother were influenced by Isma’ili propaganda; he was certainly acquainted with its tenets, but refused to adopt them. His intellectual independence was served by an extraordinary intelligence and memory, which allowed him to overtake his teachers at the age of fourteen.

It was he, we are told, who explained logic to his master al-Natili. He had no teacher in the natural sciences or in medicine; in fact, famous physicians were working under his direction when he was only sixteen. He did, however, find difficulty in understanding Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which he grasped only with the help of al-Farabi’s commentary. Having cured the amir of Khurasan of a severe illness, he was allowed to make use of the splendid library of the Samanid princes. At the age of eighteen he had mastered all the then known sciences. His subsequent progress was due only to his personal judgment.

His training through contact with life was at least equal to his development in intellectual speculation. At the age of twenty-one he wrote his first philosophical book. The following year, however, the death of his father forced him to enter the administration in order to earn his living. His judgment was swiftly appreciated. Having consulted him on medical matters, the princes had recourse to him also in matters of politics. He was a minister several times, his advice being always listened to; but he became an object of envy, sometimes persecuted by his enemies and sometimes coveted by princes opposing those to whom he wished to remain loyal. He took flight and was obliged to hide on several occasions, earning his living by medical consultations. He was imprisoned, escaped, lived for fourteen years in relative peace at the court of Isfahan and died at Hamadan, during an expedition of the prince ‘Ala’ al-Dawla, in 428/1037. He was buried there; and a monument was erected to him to celebrate the (hijri) millenary of his birth.

If his works are to be understood, they should not be thought of as those of a philosopher who lived in his books. He was occupied all day by affairs of state, and he laboured by night on his great works, which were written with astonishing rapidity. He was never safe, and was frequently compelled to move; he would write on horseback, and sometimes in prison, his only resource for reference being his memory. It has been found surprising that he differs from Aristotle in his works: but he quoted him without re-reading him, and, above all, his independence of mind inclined him to present his own personally worked out thought, rather than to repeat the works of another. Besides, his personal training was different. He was a man who lived in touch with the concrete, constantly faced with difficulties, and a great physician who dealt with specific cases. Aristotle’s Logic seemed to him insufficient, because it could not be applied in a way that was sufficiently close to life. Many recent controversies have been aroused since the study of his works has increased, especially at the time of his millenary, but the most plausible view of his personality is still the following: he is a scientific man, who attempts to bring the Greek theories to the level of that which needs to be expressed by the study of the concrete, when apprehended by a great mind.

The secret of his evolution, however, will remain concealed from us as long as we do not possess such important works as the Kitab al-Insaf, the ‘Book of Impartial Judgment’, which investigated 28,000 questions, and his ‘Eastern Philosophy’, of which we have only a fragment.

The corpus of Ibn Sina’s works that has come down to us is considerable, but incomplete. To the many questions that were put to him he replied hastily, without always taking care to keep his texts. Al-Juzajani has preserved several of these; others have been transmitted with different titles, others lost. The manuscript of the Insaf disappeared at the sack of Isfahan, in his own lifetime. The fundamental bibliography is that which al-Juzajani included in his biography, but it is not exhaustive. G. C. Anawati lists a total of 276 works, including texts noted as doubtful and some apocryphal works, in his bibliography of 1950. Mahdavi, in 1954, lists 131 authentic, and 110 doubtful works. Ibn Sina was known primarily as a philosopher and a physician, but he contributed also to the advancement of all the sciences that were accessible in his day: natural history, physics, chemistry, astronomy, mathematics, music. Economics and politics benefited from his experience as a statesman. Moral and religious questions (not necessarily pertaining to mysticism), Qur’anic exegesis, statements on ‘ufi doctrine and behaviour produced minor writings. He wrote poetry for instructional purposes, for he versified epitomes of logic and medicine, but he had also the abilitiesQof a true poet, clothing his philosophical doctrine in images, both in verse (as in his poem on the soul) and in prose, in symbolic narratives whose meaning has given rise to controversy [see Hayy b. yaqzan].

Medicine is the subject of separate works; but natural history and mathematics are thought of as parts of philosophy. Thus, his principal treatise on these sciences is included in the great Kitab al-Shifa’, ‘Book of Healing [of the Soul]’, in the same way as that on Metaphysics, while the famous Qanun fi ‘l-tibb, ‘Canon of Medicine’, is a separate work.

The Qanun appears to have formed a more consciously coherent whole than the philosophical works. Because it constituted a monumental unity, which maintained its authority until modern times when experimental science began, and because it still remained more accessible than Hippocrates and Galen, it served as a basis for seven centuries of medical teaching and practice. Even today it is still possible to derive useful information from it, for Dr. ‘Abd Allah Ahmadieh, a clinician of Tehran, has studied the therapeutics of Avicenna and is said to use them with good results, particularly in treating rheumatism.

The Qanun is the clear and ordered ‘Summa’ of all the medical knowledge of Ibn Sina’s time, augmented from his own observations. It is divided into five books. The first contains generalities concerning the human body, sickness, health and general treatment and therapeutics (French translation of the treatise on Anatomy by P. de Koning, 1905; adaptation giving an incomplete resume of the first book, in English, by Cameron Grüner, 1930). The second contains the Materia Medica and the Pharmacology of herbs; the page on experimentation in medicine (115, of the Rome 1593 edition) quoted in the Introduction to the French translation of the Isharat, 58, is to be found there. This passage sets out the three methods-agreement, difference and concomitant variations-that are usually regarded as characteristic of modern science. The third book deals with special pathology, studied by organs, or rather by systems (German translation of the treatise on diseases of the eyes, by Hirschberg and Lippert, 1902). The fourth book opens with the famous treatise on fevers; then follow the treatise on signs, symptoms, diagnostics and prognostics, minor surgery, tumours, wounds, fractures and bites, and that on poisons. The fifth book contains the pharmacopoeia.

Several treatises take up in isolation a number of the data in the Qanun and deal with particular points. Some are very well-known: their smaller size assured them of a wide circulation. Among the most widely diffused are treatises on the pulse, the medical pharmacopoeia, advice for the conservation of health and the study of diarrhoea; in addition, monographs on various remedies, chicory, oxymel, balsam, bleeding. The virtues of wine are not neglected.

Physicians were offered a mnemonic in the form of a poem which established the essentials of Avicenna’s theory and practice: principles, observations, advice on therapeutics and dietetics, simple surgical techniques. This is the famous Urjuza fi ‘l-tibb, which was translated into Latin several times from the 13th to the 17th century, under the title Cantica Avicennae (ed. with French trans. by H. Jahier and A. Noureddine, Paris 1956, Poeme de la Medecine, together with Armengaud de Blaise’s Latin translation).

Ibn Sina’s philosophical works have come down to us in a mutilated condition. The important Kitab al-Shifa’ is complete (critical text in process of publication, Cairo 1952-). Extracts chosen by the author himself as being the most characteristic make up the Kitab al-Najat, ‘The Book of Salvation [from Error]’, which is not an independent redaction, as was thought until 1937 (table of concordances established by A.-M. Goichon in La distinction de l’essence et de l’existence d’apres Ibn Sina, 499-503). The Kitab al-Isharat wa ‘l-tanbihat, ‘Book of directives and remarks’, is complete (trans. into Persian and French), as is the Danishnama-i ‘Ala’i, ‘The Book of Knowledge for ‘Ala’”, a resume of his doctrine written at the request of the prince ‘Ala’ al-Dawla. We have only fragments of the Kitab al-Insaf, ‘Book of Impartial Judgment between the Easterners and the Westerners’, which have been published by A. Badawi, and a small part of the Mantiq al-mashriqiyyin, ‘Logic of the Easterners’, which is the logic of his ‘Eastern Philosophy’, the rest of it being lost. A fairly large number of minor writings are preserved; they illuminate points of detail which are often important, but are far from completing the lacunas.

Ibn Sina’s was too penetrating a mind, and one too concerned with the absolute, not to venture outside the individual sciences. He looked for the principle and the guarantee of these, and this led him to set above them, on the one hand, the science of being, Metaphysics, and, on the other, the universal tool of truth, Logic, or ‘the instrumental science’, as the falasifa termed it.

As far as one can tell in the absence of several of his fundamental works, he seems to have been an innovator particularly in logic, correcting the excess of abstraction which does not permit Aristotle to take sufficient account of change, which is present everywhere and at all times in the terrestrial world; and, thus, of the difference between strict (mutlaq) meaning, and concrete meaning, specified by the particular ‘conditions’ in which a thing is actualized. As a physician, he enters into logic when he admits a sign as the middle term of a syllogism. He gives it the force of a proof, as the latter is recognized in a symptom in medical diagnosis (see Introduction to the French trans. of the Isharat).

In Metaphysics the doctrine of Ibn Sina is most individual, and is also illuminated by his personal antecedents. On the other hand, his thought was fashioned by three teachers, of whom, however, he knew only two by name: Aristotle and al-Farabi, who introduced several of

the great concepts subsequently developed by Ibn Sina. The third was Plotinus, who came down to him under the name of Aristotle, in the so-called ‘Theology of Aristotle’ [see aristutalis], which was composed of extracts from Plotinus’s Enneads, and presented as the culmination of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. This error of attribution dogs the whole of Avicenna’s work. As a born metaphysician he earned the title of ‘Philosopher of being’ but as a realist he wished to understand essences in their actualized state, so that he is just as much the ‘Philosopher of essence’. The whole of his metaphysics is ordered round the double problem of the origin of being and its transmission to essence, but to individually actualized essence (cf. Goichon, La distinction de l’essence et de l’existence d’apres Ibn Sina, Paris 1937).

It is at this point that a free interpretation of Aristotle and Plotinus gives him his theory of the creation of forms by emanation. This is linked with a cosmogony taken from the apocryphal Theology, but is also inspired by hylemorphism and Aristotelian data on the soul. The extensive place occupied in his thought by the intelligence prompts him to this startling view: the gift of being is linked with the light of the intelligence. Moreover, Ibn Sina is a believer; in accordance with Islam he believes in God as the Creator. None of the philosophies handed down from pagan antiquity takes account of this. He attempts to integrate dogma with his philosophical formulation. In fact, he does not succeed very well, but he continually works in this direction.

The first certitude apprehended by the human mind, he says, is that of being, which is apprehended by means of sense-perceptions. The idea of being, however, is so deep-rooted in man that it could be perceived outside of the sensible. This prefiguration of the Cartesian ‘Cogito ergo sum’ appears to have two causes: intuition (Hads) is so powerful in Ibn Sina (see in the Physics of the Danishnama the part that it played for him) that he bases himself here on a metaphysical apprehension of being; in addition, since the human soul, according to him, is a separate intelligence, which leads its own spiritual existence while being united with the body, it is capable of apprehending itself directly.

The second certitude is that the being thus apprehended in man, and in every existing thing, is not present there of necessity. The essence of ‘man’, ‘horse’ or ‘stone’ does not imply the necessity of the existence of a particular man or horse. Existence is given to actualized, concrete beings by a Being that differs from all of them: it is not one of the essences that have no existence in themselves, but its essence is its very being. The Creator is the First Cause; as a consequence of this theory the proof of the existence of God is restricted to Metaphysics, and not to Physics, as happens when God is proved to be the prime mover.

A Western controversy enters here: did Avicenna really believe in the analogy of being? It is true that he does not place the uncreated Being in the genus Substance or in a genus Being; but if he proceeds from knowledge of created beings to that of the uncreated Being, is not this a proof that he considers their natures to be allied? He certainly apprehends an analogy between the being of substance and that of accident, as he states explicitly, but did he go further? (see M. Cruz Hernandez, passim).

Ibn Sina did not formulate the distinction between the uncreated Being and created beings as clearly as did Thomas Aquinas, but the latter does base himself on Ibn Sina’s doctrine; only being is in God, God is in no genus and being is not a genus. He then sets out his thought precisely (cf. Vasteenkiste, Avicenna-Citaten bij S. Thomas, in Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, September 1953, citations nos. 12, 13, 14, 15, 20, 148, 330, pp. 460-1, 473 and 491).

With the principles established, two reasons for the omission of the conclusion are plausible, but neither involves the distinction not being made. Either, having set it out and admitted it, he withdrew it with difficulty because of the confusion between the data of Aristotle and Plotinus, or, as G. M. Wickens (Avicenna, scientist and philosopher, 52) suggests, he does not speak of it as a discovery because the celebrated distinction was then generally admitted-as Abu Hayyan al-TawHidi says. But Ibn Sina maintains that God, as he conceives Him, is ‘the first with respect to the being of the Universe, anterior to that being, and also, consequently, outside it’ (E. Gilson, L’esprit de la philosophie medievale2, 80-1).

However, this apparent impetus of Ibn Sina is interrupted by the data of Plotinus, for they inspire the emanatist theory of creation. The Qur’an, like the Old and New Testaments, explains creation by a freeQact of will on the part of God. For Ibn Sina, by way of Plotinus, the necessary Being is such in all its modes-and thus as creator-and being overflows from it. (Here the reader will ask himself the question: ‘Is it an analogous being? is it not rather the same being?’) Moreover, this emanation does not occur freely, and creation involves intermediaries, which are also creators. From the One can come only one. The necessary Being thus produces a single Intelligence. This, having a cause, necessarily possesses a duality of being and knowledge. It introduces multiplicity into the world; from it can derive another Intelligence, a celestial Soul and a celestial body. Ptolemy’s system becomes the framework of creative emanation; emanation descends from sphere to sphere as far as a tenth pure Intelligence, which governs, not a sphere, but our terrestrial world, which is made, unlike the others, of corruptible matter. This brings with it a multiplicity which surpasses human knowledge but is perfectly possessed and dominated by the active Intellect, the tenth Intelligence. Its role is demonstrated in a poetic and symbolic form in the ‘Tale of Hayy b. Yaqzan;, a name that refers to the active Intellect itself.

The philosophical origin of this active Intellect is the passage in the De Anima in which Aristotle refers by this name to the active part of the human soul. Ibn Sina irremediably mutilates the latter by taking away from it this active part, and with it its most noble action and its highest intellectual function: abstraction of intelligibles. This active Intellect, which, according to Aristotle, produces all intelligibles, is now a separate Intelligence. Thus the human soul receives them passively, and so cannot think except by leave of the Intellect; comprehension, knowledge and the sciences are now no longer its affair. It can elaborate only that which is given to it by the active Intellect. The latter produces not only these intelligibles but also all the substantial forms that are created in accordance with the models that it has conceived in conformity with the potentialities of matter. It is in this way, Ibn Sina replies to Plato’s anxious question (Parmenides, 131 a-b), that the concrete being can share in the Idea. The active Intellect has an ability which Plato sought for in vain: it apprehends the two series of relative perceptions, both the forms with their mutual relationships and the concrete beings with their mutual relationships; in addition, it apprehends their common repository, which is its own essence (cf. Goichon, La theorie des formes chez Avicenne, in Atti XII congr. intern. de filosofia, ix, at 137-8). A reply is also given to the question of Aristotle as to the provenance of form and the contribution of the Ideas to sensible beings (Metaph., Z 8 and M 5).

The human soul by itself can attain only the first three degrees of abstraction: sensation, imagination and the action of estimation that extracts individual non-sensible ideas. It then apprehends the intelligible that is given to it from outside. Intuition is due to its joining with the active Intellect.

Being and intelligence overflow like a river from the necessary Being and descend to the extreme limits of the created. There is an equally full re-ascent, produced by creatures’ love and desire for their creators, as far as the supreme Principle, which corresponds to the abundance of this gift. This beautiful concept, which could derive only from a soul inclined towards religion, has been thought of as mystical. The Risala fi ‘l-‘ishq, ‘The Epistle on Love’, however, is primarily a metaphysical explanation of the tendency of every being towards its good, and a physical explanation of the motion of the stars; they imitate in their fashion, which is material, the unceasing action of the pure Act. The spheres, in fact, thus imitate the unceasing desire of the celestial Souls which correspond to each one of them. The rational soul of man tends towards its good with a conscious motion of apprehension of, and love for, the active Intellect, and, through it, for the necessary Being, which is pure Good. In the highest states, however, it can tend directly towards the latter.

Ibn Sina believed firmly in the immortality of the soul. Corruption cannot touch it, for it is immaterial. The proof of this immateriality lies in its capability of apprehending the intelligibles, which are in no way material. He is much more hesitant on the question of the resurrection of the body, which he at first admits in the Shifa’ and the Najat, and then denies in the epistle A·Hawiyya, after indicating in the ‘Tale of Hayy b. Yaqzan’; that this dogma is often an object of temptations. He appears finally to have decided to understand it in a symbolic sense.

Among the fierce controversies to which Avicenna’s thought has given rise is the discussion as to whether or not he should be considered a mystic. At first sight, the whole range of expressions that he uses to speak of love’s re-ascending as far as to the Creator leads one to an affirmative interpretation-not in an esoteric way [see Hayy b. yaqzan], but in the positive sense of the love of God. The more one studies his philosophical doctrine, the more one finds that it illuminates these expressions. The stages of the Sufis, studied in the Isharat, leave rather the impression of experiences observed by a great, curious and respectful mind, which, however, does not participate. Ibn Sina is a believer, and this fact should be maintained in opposition to those who have made of him a lover of pleasure who narrowly escapes being a hypocrite, although there is so much seriousness in his life and such efforts to reconcile his philosophy with his faith-even if he is not always successful. He is far above the gnosis impregnated with occultism and paganism to which some would reduce him. Is he a mystic in the exact sense that the word has in Catholic theology? It reserves the word for one whose whole life is a great love of God, in a kind of intimacy of heart and thought with Him, so that God holds the first place in all things and everything is apprehended as related to Him.

Had it been thus with Ibn Sina, his writings would give a totally different impression. Nevertheless, at bottom he did perhaps apprehend God. It is in the simple expression of apprehension through the heart, in the secret of the heart (sirr), in flashes, however short and infrequent, that we are led to see in him a beginning of true mystic apprehension, in opposition to the gnosis and its symbols, for at this depth of the heart there is no longer any need for words.

One doubt, however, still enters in: his general doctrine of apprehension, and some of the terms that he uses, in fact, in texts on sirr, could be applied at least as well to a privileged connexion with the active Intellect, and not with God Himself (cf. Goichon, Le ‘sirr’ (l’intime du coeur) dans la doctrine avicennienne de la connaissance). Again, on this question, the absence of his last great work, the ‘Eastern Philosophy’, precludes a definite answer.

This irreparable lacuna in the transmission of his works does not allow us to understand in what respects he wished to complete, and even to correct, Aristotle, as he states in the prologue. As a hypothesis, suggested by his constant efforts to express the concrete and by his biography, we may suppose that he wished to make room for the oriental scientific tradition, which was more experimental than Greek science. The small alterations made to Aristotelian logic are slanted in this direction. In metaphysics, it is probable that he was shocked by the contradictions between Plotinus and Aristotle that were evident in the texts which the knowledge of the time attributed to one single author, and that he wished to resolve these anomalies by giving new explanations.

The transmission of Greek science by the Arabs, and the translation of the works of the Arabs into Latin, produced the first Renaissance in Southern Europe, which began in the 10th century in Sicily, flourished in the 12th round Toledo, and soon afterwards in France. The two principal works of Ibn Sina, the Shifa’ and the Qanun, made him an undisputed master in medicine, natural sciences and philosophy.

From the 12th to the 16th century the teaching and practice of medicine were based on him. The works of Abu Bakr MuHammad b. Zakariyya’ al-Razi were also known, and he was considered to be a better clinician; but the Qanun provided an irreplaceable didactic corpus, for the Kitab al-Kulliyyat fi ‘l-tibb of Ibn Rushd corresponded only with the first part of the Qanun. The latter was translated in its entirety between 1150 and 1187 by Gerard of Cremona, and, in all, eighty-seven translations of it were made, some of which were only partial. The majority were into Latin, but several Hebrew translations were also made, in Spain, Italy and the south of France. The medical translations are less good than those of the philosophical works; some words transcribed in Arabic from Greek were not understood or identified, and some Arabic technical terms were more or less transcribed in Latin, and remain incomprehensible. The Qanun formed the basis of teaching at all the universities. It appears in the oldest known syllabus of teaching given to the School of Medicine at Montpellier, a bull of Clement V, dating from 1309, and in all subsequent ones until 1557. Ten years later Galen was preferred to Ibn Sina, but the latter continued to be taught until the 17th century. The editing of the Arabic text, at Rome in 1593, demonstrates the esteem in which he was still held. (On the teaching of the works of Avicenna in the universities, see A. Germain, L’Ecole de medecine de Montpellier …, Montpellier 1880, 71; Stephen d’Irsay, Histoire des universites franaises et etrangeres des origines a nos jours, Paris 1933, i, 119; C. Elgood, A medical history of Persia … until the year 1932, Cambridge 1951, 205-9). Chaucer reminds us in the Prologue to the Canterbury Tales that no doctor should be ignorant of him. Almost all, in fact, possessed either fragments of the Qanun, especially the ‘Fevers’ and the ‘Diseases of the eyes’, or shorter writings, the treatise on the pulse or that on ‘Diseases of the heart’. All Arab authors, from the 7th/13th to the 10th/16th century, are dependent on Ibn Sina, even though they question him, like the father of Ibn Zuhr (Avenzoar), or augment and correct him, like Ibn al-Nafis, who recorded his discovery of pulmonary circulation in his commentary on the Qanun; he wrote a summary of the Qanun which any physician could obtain more easily than he could the original text.

In the West several physicians learned Arabic for the sake of the works of Ibn Sina. The first known influence appears in the works of a Dane, Henrik Harpestraeng, a royal physician who died in 1244. Arnold of Villeneuve, born at Valence, translated the treatise on the diseases of the heart, as well as some of the books of al-Kindi and other Arab authors. Some surgeons also quoted him as their authority: William of Saliceto in Italy, and his disciple Lanfranc, the founder of surgery in France; Guy of Chauliac, who died in 1368, and whose teaching employed Arabic terms and doctrines. At the University of Bologna, anatomy was still being taught in Arabic terms in the 14th century.

The Renaissance brought a violent reaction; Leonardo da Vinci rejected Ibn Sina’s anatomy, but, for want of another vocabulary, used the Arabic terms. Paracelsus burned the Qanun at Basle. Harvey dealt him a severe blow by publishing his discovery of the major circulation in 1628.

The natural sciences presented in the Shifa’ were much used by the mediaeval encyclopaedists, as were the treatises of al-Razi and apocryphal treatises. The ‘Treatise on Animals’ was translated by Michael Scot; Albertus Magnus employed the mineralogy (on Ibn Sina’s scientific influence, see G. Sarton, Introduction to the history of science, ii, passim.). In physics, Ibn Sina was an Aristotelian, and as such inferior to al-Razi, who had discovered the existence of the vacuum, which he himself denied. However, he opposed the theory of the transmutation of metals, and hence alchemy (for citations to this effect from several Arab authors, see the introduction by Holmyard and Mandeville to their translation of Avicennae De congelatione et conglutinatione lapidum, Paris 1927, 6-7).

Ibn Sina’s influence in philosophy was less absolute and more disputed, but more lasting, for the use made of him by St Thomas Aquinas embodied certain of his proofs in Catholic theology (cf. Goichon, La philosophie d’Avicenne et son influence en Europe medievale, Paris 1944, ch. III).

The translation of the Shifa’ came at a moment when Aristotle was scarcely known, and that only through the ‘Posterior Analytics’, the ‘Topics’ and the ‘Refutation of the Sophists’. The corpus that presented a ‘Metaphysics’, the ‘Treatise on the Soul’ and that on the ‘Heavens’, etc. seemed to hold another significance. It was, however, thought to be a simple commentary on Aristotle. For a century it received unreserved admiration; when Aristotle was better known, it was still thought that the Shifa’ augmented his work on the subject of the origin of the world, on God, the soul, the intelligence and angels. He was placed in the Neoplatonist and Augustinian traditions; his attempts to reconcile philosophy and faith corresponded with the ardent desires of the Schoolmen. He was forbidden by the decrees of 1210 and 1215, referring to ‘Aristoteles et sequaces ejus’, which banned Ibn Sina from the Sorbonne. But his role remained undiminished in private discussions.

After acclaim for his similarities with Christian thought came criticism of his divergences from it, violently initiated by William of Auvergne in 1230. Nevertheless, a pontifical decree of Gregory IX, in 1231, once more permitted the study of Ibn Sina’s philosophy. The lacunas, however, were now apparent. Nonetheless, the thought of all philosophers was nourished by his, to such a degree that it is impossible to tell what it would have been like without him. Latin scholasticism owes to his opponent, William of Auvergne, the fact that it received from him the distinction between essence and existence, which William considered that he had found in him.

Another current of thought, stemming from English centres of study, developed particularly in the Franciscan order. It saw Ibn Sina as more of a philosopher, augmenting Saint Augustine: the active Intellect was like the sun of minds and the internal Master. They believed that he opened up a whole mystic world. Roger Bacon and Duns Scotus were influenced by him. The latter, however, based his doctrine of the univocity of being on the same text that Thomas Aquinas had used to support the opposite doctrine.

Selection was gradually practised in the corpus of Ibn Sina. He took his definitive place, together with Saint Thomas Aquinas. The distinction between essence and existence became one of the fundamentals of Thomist philosophy. It gave an explanation for the immateriality of angels; Saint Thomas’s De Ente et Essentia is imbued with Avicennism. The better the theologian masters his own thought, the less he cites Ibn Sina (see the quotations in Vansteenkiste, op. cit.), but he still respects him. Saint Thomas’s commentators, Cajetan and Jean de Saint-Thomas, writing respectively at the end of the 15th century and during the 17th, still allotted to Ibn Sina the place that he had taken in Thomism, the place that is definitely his.

(A.-M. Goichon)
Source: http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/sina/

This site was last updated 03/04/07

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938)

February 5, 2009

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) Although not the first to coin the term, it is uncontroversial to suggest that the German philosopher, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), is the “father” of the philosophical movement known as phenomenology. Phenomenology can be roughly described as the sustained attempt to describe experiences (and the “things themselves”) without metaphysical and theoretical speculations. Husserl suggested that only by suspending or bracketing away the “natural attitude” could philosophy becomes its own distinctive and rigorous science, and he insisted that phenomenology is a science of consciousness rather than of empirical things. Indeed, in Husserl’s hands phenomenology began as a critique of both psychologism and naturalism. Naturalism is the thesis that everything belongs to the world of nature and can be studied by the methods appropriate to studying that world (that is, the methods of the hard sciences). Husserl argued that the study of consciousness must actually be very different from the study of nature. For him, phenomenology does not proceed from the collection of large amounts of data and to a general theory beyond the data itself, as in the scientific method of induction. Rather, it aims to look at particular examples without theoretical presuppositions (such as the phenomena of intentionality, of love, of two hands touching each other, and so forth), before then discerning what is essential and necessary to these experiences. Although all of the key, subsequent phenomenologists (Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, Levinas, Derrida) have contested aspects of Husserl’s characterization of phenomenology, they have nonetheless been heavily indebted to him. As such, he is arguably one of the most important and influential philosophers of the twentieth century. The key features of his work, and his understanding of the phenomenological method, are considered in what follows.

The elaboration of phenomenology

Some years after the publication of his main work, the Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations; first edition, 1900-1901) Husserl made some key conceptual elaborations which led him to assert that in order to study the structure of consciousness, one would have to distinguish between the act of consciousness and the phenomena at which it is directed (the object-in-itself, transcendent to consciousness). Knowledge of essences would only be possible by “bracketing” all assumptions about the existence of an external world. This procedure he called epoché. These new concepts prompted the publication of the Ideen (Ideas) in 1913, in which they were at first incorporated, and a plan for a second edition of the Logische Untersuchungen.

From the Ideen onward, Husserl concentrated on the ideal, essential structures of consciousness. The metaphysical problem of establishing the material reality of what we perceive was of little interest to Husserl in spite of his being a transcendental idealist. Husserl proposed that the world of objects and ways in which we direct ourselves toward and perceive those objects is normally conceived of in what he called the “natural standpoint”, which is characterized by a belief that objects materially exist and exhibit properties that we see as emanating from them. Husserl proposed a radical new phenomenological way of looking at objects by examining how we, in our many ways of being intentionally directed toward them, actually “constitute” them (to be distinguished from materially creating objects or objects merely being figments of the imagination); in the Phenomenological standpoint, the object ceases to be something simply “external” and ceases to be seen as providing indicators about what it is, and becomes a grouping of perceptual and functional aspects that imply one another under the idea of a particular object or “type”. The notion of objects as real is not expelled by phenomenology, but “bracketed” as a way in which we regard objects instead of a feature that inheres in an object’s essence founded in the relation between the object and the perceiver. In order to better understand the world of appearances and objects, phenomenology attempts to identify the invariant features of how objects are perceived and pushes attributions of reality into their role as an attribution about the things we perceive (or an assumption underlying how we perceive objects).

In a later period, Husserl began to wrestle with the complicated issues of intersubjectivity (specifically, how communication about an object can be assumed to refer to the same ideal entity) and tries new methods of bringing his readers to understand the importance of phenomenology to scientific inquiry (and specifically to psychology) and what it means to “bracket” the natural attitude. The Crisis of the European Sciences is Husserl’s unfinished work that deals most directly with these issues. In it, Husserl for the first time attempts a historical overview of the development of Western philosophy and science, emphasizing the challenges presented by their increasingly (one-sidedly) empirical and naturalistic orientation. Husserl declares that mental and spiritual reality possess their own reality independent of any physical basis, and that a science of the mind (‘Geisteswissenschaft‘) must be established on as scientific a foundation as the natural sciences have managed:

“It is my conviction that intentional phenomenology has for the first time made spirit as spirit the field of systematic scientific experience, thus effecting a total transformation of the task of knowledge.”

The Nazi era

Professor Husserl was denied the use of the library at Freiburg as a result of the anti-Jewish legislation the National Socialists (Nazis) passed in April 1933. It is rumoured that his former pupil and Nazi Party member, Martin Heidegger, informed Husserl that he was discharged, but Heidegger later denied this, labelling it as slander. Heidegger (whose philosophy Husserl considered to be the result of a faulty departure from, and grave misunderstanding of, Husserl’s own teachings and methods) removed the dedication to Husserl from his most widely known work, Being and Time, when it was reissued in 1941. This was not due to diminishing relations between the two philosophers, however, but rather as a result of a suggested censorship by Heidegger’s publisher who feared that the book may be banned by the Nazi regime. The dedication can still be found in a footnote on page 38, thanking Husserl for his guidance and generosity. The philosophical relation between Husserl and Heidegger is discussed at length by Bernard Stiegler in the film The Ister.

After his death, Husserl’s manuscripts, amounting to approximately 40,000 pages of “Gabelsbergerstenography and his complete research library, were smuggled to Belgium by Herman Van Breda in 1939 and deposited at Leuven to form the Husserl-Archives of the Higher Institute of Philosophy. Much of the material in his research manuscripts has been published in the Husserliana critical edition series.

The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl

Meaning and Object in Husserl

From Logical Investigations (1900/1901) to Experience and Judgment (published in 1939), Husserl expressed clearly the difference between meaning and object. He identified several different kinds of names. For example, there are names that have the role of properties that uniquely identify an object. Each of these names express a meaning and designate the same object. Examples of this are “the victor in Jena” and “the loser in Waterloo”, or “the equilateral triangle” and “the equiangular triangle”; in both cases, both names express different meanings, but designate the same object. There are names which have no meaning, but have the role of designating an object: “Aristotle”, “Socrates”, and so on. Finally, there are names which designate a variety of objects. These are called “universal names”; their meaning is a “concept” and refers to a series of objects (the extension of the concept). The way we know sensible objects is called “sensible intuition”.

Husserl also identifies a series of “formal words” which are necessary to form sentences and have no sensible correlates. Examples of formal words are “a”, “the”, “more than”, “over”, “under”, “two”, “group”, and so on. Every sentence must contain formal words to designate what Husserl calls “formal categories”. There are two kinds of categories: meaning categories and formal-ontological categories. Meaning categories relate judgments; they include forms of conjunction, disjunction, forms of plural, among others. Formal-ontological categories relate objects and include notions such as set, cardinal number, ordinal number, part and whole, relation, and so on. The way we know these categories is through a faculty of understanding called “categorial intuition”.

Through sensible intuition our consciousness constitutes what Husserl calls a “situation of affairs” (Sachlage). It is a passive constitution where objects themselves are presented to us. To this situation of affairs, through categorial intuition, we are able to constitute a “state of affairs” (Sachverhalt). One situation of affairs through objective acts of consciousness (acts of constituting categorially) can serve as the basis for constituting multiple states of affairs. For example, suppose a and b are two sensible objects in a certain situation of affairs. We can use it as basis to say, “a<b” and “b>a“, two judgments which designate different states of affairs. For Husserl a sentence has a proposition or judgment as its meaning, and refers to a state of affairs which has a situation of affairs as a reference base.

Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics

Husserl believed that truth-in-itself has as ontological correlate being-in-itself, just as meaning categories have formal-ontological categories as correlates. Logic is a formal theory of judgment, that studies the formal a priori relations among judgments using meaning categories. Mathematics, on the other hand, is formal ontology; it studies all the possible forms of being (of objects). Hence for both logic and mathematics, the different formal categories are the objects of study, not the sensible objects themselves. The problem with the psychological approach to mathematics and logic is that it fails to account for the fact that this approach is about formal categories, and not simply about abstractions from sensibility alone. The reason why we do not deal with sensible objects in mathematics is because of another faculty of understanding called “categorial abstraction.” Through this faculty we are able to get rid of sensible components of judgments, and just focus on formal categories themselves.

Thanks to “eidetic intuition” (or “essential intuition”), we are able to grasp the possibility, impossibility, necessity and contingency among concepts and among formal categories. Categorial intuition, along with categorial abstraction and eidetic intuition, are the basis for logical and mathematical knowledge.

Husserl criticized the logicians of his day for not focusing on the relation between subjective processes that give us objective knowledge of pure logic. All subjective activities of consciousness need an ideal correlate, and objective logic (constituted noematically) as it is constituted by consciousness needs a noetic correlate (the subjective activities of consciousness).

Husserl stated that logic has three strata, each further away from consciousness and psychology than those that precede it.

  • The first stratum is what Husserl called a “morphology of meanings” concerning a priori ways to relate judgments to make them meaningful. In this stratum we elaborate a “pure grammar” or a logical syntax, and he would call its rules “laws to prevent non-sense”, which would be similar to what logic calls today “formation rules“. Mathematics, as logic’s ontological correlate, also has a similar stratum, a “morphology of formal-ontological categories”.
  • The second stratum would be called by Husserl “logic of consequence” or the “logic of non-contradiction” which explores all possible forms of true judgments. He includes here syllogistic classic logic, propositional logic and that of predicates. This is a semantic stratum, and the rules of this stratum would be the “laws to avoid counter-sense” or “laws to prevent contradiction”. They are very similar to today’s logic “transformation rules“. Mathematics also has a similar stratum which is based among others on pure theory of pluralities, and a pure theory of numbers. They provide a science of the conditions of possibility of any theory whatsoever. Husserl also talked about what he called “logic of truth” which consists of the formal laws of possible truth and its modalities, and precedes the third logical third stratum.
  • The third stratum is metalogical, what he called a “theory of all possible forms of theories.” It explores all possible theories in an a priori fashion, rather than the possibility of theory in general. We could establish theories of possible relations between pure forms of theories, investigate these logical relations and the deductions from such general connection. The logician is free to see the extension of this deductive, theoretical sphere of pure logic.

The ontological correlate to the third stratum is the “theory of manifolds” In formal ontology, it is a free investigation where a mathematician can assign several meanings to several symbols, and all their possible valid deductions in a general and indeterminate manner. It is, properly speaking, the most universal mathematics of all. Through the posit of certain indeterminate objects (formal-ontological categories) as well as any combination of mathematical axioms, mathematicians can explore the apodeictic connections between them, as long as consistency is preserved.

According to Husserl, this view of logic and mathematics accounted for the objectivity of a series of mathematical developments of his time, such as n-dimensional manifolds (both Euclidean and non-Euclidean), Hermann Grassmann‘s theory of extensions, William Rowan Hamilton‘s Hamiltonians, Sophus Lie‘s theory of transformation groups, and Cantor’s set theory.

Zentrale Gedanken und Begriffe

Erkenntnis ist zwar an psychische und physiologische Prozesse gebunden, sie ist aber nicht mit diesen identisch. Aus einem empirisch psychologischen Satz kann niemals eine logische Norm abgeleitet werden. Empirische Sätze sind wahrscheinlich und können falsifiziert werden. Logik hingegen unterliegt nicht der Kausalität. Philosophie als Wissenschaft kann sich daher nicht an den Naturalismus binden. Philosophie, Erkenntnistheorie, Logik und reine Mathematik sind Idealwissenschaften, deren Gesetze ideale Wahrheiten a priori ausdrücken.

Phänomenologie als Wesensschau des Gegebenen soll die voraussetzungslose Grundlage allen Wissens sein.

Intentionalität des Bewusstseins: Intentionalität ist die Gerichtetheit des Bewusstseins auf einen Gegenstand (Sachverhalt). Es gibt kein reines Subjekt und kein reines Objekt (Noema), sondern beide sind stets verbunden durch den Akt des Bewusstwerdens (Noesis), in dem die Gegenstände konstituiert werden. Alle Akte des Bewusstseins sind sinnstiftend und konstituieren überhaupt erst ihre Gegenstände. Ein bewusstseinstranszendentes „eigentliches An-sich“ der Dinge (wie noch bei Kant) existiert somit nicht. Diese Sichtweise übernahm Husserl von Franz Brentano.

Phänomenologische Reduktion: Um den wahren Wesensgehalt eines Gegenstandes zu erkennen, müssen wir unsere Einstellung zu ihm ändern. Wir müssen uns jeglichen (Vor-)Urteils ihm gegenüber enthalten. Um sich einem Gegenstand entsprechend zu nähern, muss man von jeglicher Theorie, auch den naturwissenschaftlichen absehen. Erst durch Ausschaltung aller Setzungen erscheint die Welt in ihren tatsächlichen Strukturen. Dieses Sich-zurück-nehmen nannte Husserl Epoché, beziehungsweise Einklammerung.

Der Akt, in dem ein Gegenstand unmittelbar gegeben ist, ist die kategoriale Anschauung. Der gegebene Gegenstand als vermeinter Gegenstand enthält über die rein sinnliche Wahrnehmung hinaus einen Überschuss an Intentionalität, wie er in Wörtern wie „dieser“, „ist“ oder „er“ zum Ausdruck kommt, die jenseits des Sinnlichen liegen.

Eidetische Variation: Der einzelne Gegenstand ist mit Zufälligkeit behaftet. Wenn ich zu seinem Wesen vordringen will, muss ich das Notwendige in ihm erfassen. Wesensgesetze machen den Sinn eines Gegenstandes aus. Durch Variation der Eigenschaften des Gegenstandes findet man heraus, was das Wesensnotwendige ist.

Wahrheit ist die volle Übereinstimmung von Gemeintem und Gegebenem. Das Erlebnis der Übereinstimmung ist die Evidenz oder Intuition. Evidenz in diesem Sinne ist kein Gewissheitserlebnis, sondern die unmittelbare Erfahrung. Evidenz im Sinne Husserls ist korrigierbar, wenn sich im Nachhinein zeigt, dass die damalige Erfahrung nicht zutreffend war.

Eidetische Reduktion: Aus der durch die Enthaltung gewonnenen Neutralität heraus ist es nun möglich, zum Wesen einer Sache, beziehungsweise „zu den Sachen selbst“ vorzudringen. Jetzt sind nur noch die Bewusstseinsakte selbst Gegenstand der Betrachtung. Die Existenz des Gegenstandes wird „transzendiert“. Was übrigbleibt, ist die „absolute Seinsregion des Bewusstseins“ selbst. Mit dieser eidetischen Reduktion gelingt eine Wesensschau, die uns zeigt, wie sich die Welt im Bewusstsein konstituiert.

Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft

Husserl antwortete auf Diltheys 1911 erschienene Weltanschauungsphilosophie noch im selben Jahr mit dem Aufsatz „Philosophie als Strenge Wissenschaft“ Husserl weist dort zunächst den Naturalismus zurück, da dieser sich nicht selbst über seine erkenntnistheoretischen Voraussetzungen Klarheit verschaffen kann. Dies kann nur eine „wissenschaftliche Wesenserkenntnis des Bewußtseins“ leisten und diese ist die Phänomenologie. Sie ermittelt das was allen individuellen Bewußtseinsakten gemeinsam ist, nämlich Bewußtsein von… zu sein, d.h. sie meinen ein Gegenständliches. Im Absehen von dem im von… gemeinten ergibt sich das Wesen der Bewußtseinsakte, es läßt sich als „objektive Einheit fixieren“.

Die Feststellung objektiv gültiger Tatsachen ist möglich, weil, auch wenn diese historisch Gewordene sind, sie trotzdem absolut gültig sein können – die Genesis beeinträchtigt nicht die Geltung. Als Beispiel eines Systems notwendiger Sätze nennt Husserl die Mathematik, welche für die Beurteilung der Wahrheit ihrer Theorien sich überhaupt nicht an der Historie orientieren kann. „Die ‘Idee’ der Wissenschaft […] ist eine überzeitliche, […] durch keine Relation auf den Geist einer Zeit begrenzt.“ Husserl proklamiert daher gegen die Weltanschauungsphilosophie den „Wille[n] zu strenger Wissenschaft“.

Les quatre grands principes de la phénoménologie transcendantale

La phénoménologie transcendantale est d’abord un système méthodologique d’accès à la vérité des choses. C’est pourquoi Husserl développera toute sa vie quelques principes méthodologiques fondamentaux, sur lesquels il reviendra souvent au court de sa carrière.

Intentionnalité

L’épochè révèle également par là, d’un point de vue méthodologique, l’une des structures fondamentales de la phénoménologie, une structure transcendantale du cogito : c’est l’intentionnalité. C’est de son maître Franz Brentano que Husserl reprend ce concept. Il désigne le caractère fondamentalement orienté de la conscience vis-à-vis d’un objet, quel qu’il soit. L’intentionnalité est le fait d’« être conscient de ». La conscience n’a pas le même mode d’être que des objets physiques, et c’est la structure de l’intentionnalité qui distingue le psychique du physique.

La conscience n’est pas une boîte dans laquelle entrent des images, des perceptions, etc., mais elle est à chaque fois une visée (la visée intentionnelle), qui est donneuse de sens. Par exemple, la perception d’une pomme n’est pas l’imagination d’une pomme, quoique l’objet visé (ou noème) soit le même : ce qui diffère, c’est la nature de l’acte de visée (ou noèse).

La réduction phénoménologique

Mais comment dégager ces essences à partir de l’expérience commune (Husserl dit souvent « naïve ») de la conscience, si cette expérience est toujours particulière ? Comment prétendre sortir l’universel du particulier sans sombrer dans l’arbitraire ?

L’attitude naturelle

Lorsque Husserl part à la recherche d’un fondement absolument certain, il cherche une vérité apodictique. En regardant les modes de procéder des sciences, il se rend compte qu’elles sont positives et naturellement réalistes. Mais, il en vient naturellement à se demander si l’existence du monde est, elle aussi, une évidence apodictique? Il se trouve que l’objectivité du monde est naïve, chaque affirmation positive sur le monde, qui n’a pas été soumis à la réduction, est prise dans ce que Husserl appelle l’attitude naturelle. 1° Husserl ne nie pas l’antériorité du monde dans chaque affirmation scientifique sur ce monde. 2° mais cette antériorité suffit-elle à rendre l’existence du monde incontestable, indubitable ?

La réduction phénoménologique

Pour sortir de ce paradoxe, Husserl avance la notion d’épochè, qu’il emprunte, une fois encore, à la tradition philosophique (ce terme grec a été utilisé par les Sceptiques dans le sens de « suspension du jugement »). L’épochè consiste à « mettre entre parenthèses » tout acquis préalable (jugement, opinion, croyance, hypothèse, etc.) sur un vécu de conscience quel qu’il soit, ou mieux encore, tout ce qui ne se donne pas dans l’expérience, révélant ainsi, par cette « pureté analytique » radicale, sa seule structure universelle. Elle n’est pas synonyme de la « variation eidétique », concept également forgé par Husserl et signifiant une complétude progressive en variant les angles d’approche (mémoire, imagination, etc.). Cette notion d’épochè est définie, dans les Méditations cartésiennes, comme « la méthode universelle et radicale par laquelle je me saisis comme moi pur, avec la vie de conscience pure qui m’est propre, vie dans et par laquelle le monde objectif tout entier existe pour moi, tel justement qu’il existe pour moi ». Cette méthode résulte de l’évidence apodictique d’un ego cogito qui est universel par sa présence chez tous les êtres pensants. Cette filiation cartésienne repose sur le doute hyperbolique qui laisse place à la certitude d’un être premier : l’ego constitutif. Je ne puis douter que je doute, donc je suis.

Le cogito, ou le sujet transcendantal

C’est dans le cogito que Husserl trouve le fondement absolu de sa philosophie : c’est une notion qu’il emprunte à Descartes, selon une filiation qu’il revendique explicitement dans ses Méditations cartésiennes (dont Emmanuel Lévinas assurera la traduction française). Toutefois Husserl radicalise le cogito cartésien, en en faisant non plus un premier axiome, mais le fondement même de tous les axiomes. Ce cogito est le moi transcendantal, c’est-à-dire le moi pur qui est dévoilé par la réduction phénoménologique. Ce moi transcendantal est distinct du moi psychologique, en tant que la psychologie étudie les phénomènes psychiques de manière objective, dans l’attitude du monde.

Pourquoi est-ce un fondement absolu ?

  • parce que c’est un principe auquel toute expérience revient, qui fonde toute expérience ;
  • parce qu’il n’est pas lui-même fondé (sans quoi l’on risquerait une régression à l’infini de principe en principe) ;
  • parce qu’il est universel, c’est-à-dire partagé par tous les humains, et en tout temps.

La critique du cogito cartésien

Le cogito de Husserl est toutefois différent de celui de Descartes, car il est, pour le fondateur de la phénoménologie, une pure intentionnalité. Ainsi Husserl critiquera Descartes sur le fait que ce dernier aurait réifié le cogito, en en faisant notamment un axiome, duquel sera déduit ordine géométrico les substances étendues, pensantes, et Dieu. Ses trois grandes critiques sont présentées dans la 1ère Méditations cartésiennes :

  • PRÉSUPPOSÉS SCOLASTIQUES chez Descartes, montrés notamment par Etienne Gilson.
  • PRÉJUGÉ POUR LES MATHÉMATIQUES Le fait de prendre le cogito comme axiome à partir duquel sera déduit le reste (substance spirituelle, étendue, Dieu, etc.) ordine géométrico.

En faire un axiome n’est pas suffisant, car il est le fondement de tous les axiomes. Filigrane de Husserl : Reconductibilité d’un a-priori logique à un a-priori noétique.

  • LE STATUT DU COGITO dans le monde : 1° en faire un axiome apodictique, c’est en faire une « chose du monde », c’est l’inscrire dans une attitude naturelle qui doit rester constamment en suspend chez Husserl. 2° En faire une res cogitans : le moi pur n’est pas une chose puisqu’il ne se donne pas à lui même comme les choses lui sont données.

La phénoménologie comme science eidétique

L’acceptation du cogito comme fondement absolu a pour conséquence naturelle de placer l’étude de la conscience au centre des préoccupations de la phénoménologie. Comme dans la Phénoménologie de l’esprit de Hegel, la phénoménologie husserlienne est donc une science de la conscience – mais c’est peut-être l’un des rares rapprochements possibles entre les deux entreprises, qui restent très différentes.

La phénoménologie est la science des phénomènes, de ce qui apparaît à la conscience. Pour rendre possible cette science, il faut « revenir aux choses mêmes » : les décrire telles qu’elles se présentent à la conscience.

La véritable connaissance est la connaissance des essences, c’est-à-dire de ce qui demeure invariant dans les modifications de perspectives que l’esprit a sur les choses. En effet, tout objet a ses déterminations d’après la perspective de la conscience ; l’objet vécu ne sera donc donné en totalité que par la synthèse totale des points de vue. Ainsi, pour décrire la structure des phénomènes, encore faut-il que la conscience perçoive, par l’intuition, ces essences.

C’est par allusion à Platon que Husserl appelle essences ces structures universelles que la phénoménologie entend dégager et fonder sur le cogito. Si Husserl reprend ce terme, l’un des plus vieux de la philosophie, c’est parce qu’il se situe dans une tradition philosophique qu’il entend réaliser. La philosophie est un projet consistant à vouloir dégager la structure rationnelle du monde : la phénoménologie a les moyens de réaliser ce projet.

Aperçus sur l’ontologie husserlienne

On pourra se reporter à l’ouvrage de Jacques Derrida de La Grammatologie (1967) qui l’évoque dans son chapitre II et dont ces lignes sont inspirées. Il est important de comprendre que la structure hylè-morphè recoupant intuitivement le couple conceptuel matière-forme, bien qu’elle soit une composante réelle reell et on real du vécu, n’est pas en elle-même une réalité Realität. Derrida : « Quant à l’objet intentionnel, par exemple le contenu d’une image, il n’appartient réellement reell ni au monde ni au vécu ». Est-ce à dire qu’il n’a aucune consistance ? Certes non, il s’agit pour Husserl d’une composante non-réelle du vécu. On voit donc que son ontologie emprunte un vocabulaire déroutant pour la tradition et que la zone du vécu accueille des types de strates hiérarchisées : la réalité, la composante réelle de la structure hylé-morphé et la composante non-réelle de l’objet intentionnel. Ici non-réel n’est aucunement synonyme d’inexistence. Simplement, l’objet intentionnel doit être appréhendé de manière nettement plus subjectiviste que les idéalités objectives platoniciennes. Conclusion: l’image acoustique par exemple, en tant qu’objet intentionnel,ne doit pas être analysée comme la copie de la réalité externe par la réalité interne. Il s’agit précisément de refouler le modèle du portrait critiqué dans les Ideen I et de surmonter l’opposition entre la réalité extérieure et la réalité intérieure.

Teoria

Presentazioni e Rappresentazioni

Da Brentano e Stumpf riprende la distinzione tra il modo proprio ed improprio di presentare (Vorstellen). Husserl spiega questa distinzione con un esempio: se uno si trova di fronte ad una casa, egli ha una presentazione propria e diretta di questa casa nell’intuizione (Anschauung), ma se uno la stesse cercando e avesse solo una descrizione (la casa all’angolo tra le strade tale e tale), allora questa descrizione sarebbe una presentazione indiretta ed impropria della casa.

In altre parole, una presentazione propria è possibile solo quando si ha accesso all’oggetto presentato in maniera diretta, quando è attualmente presente. Una presentazione impropria si ha quando questo non è possibile, e bisogna ricorre a maniere indirette, come segni, simboli, descrizioni, etc., i quali costituiscono una presentazione indiretta ed impropria.

Un ulteriore elemento importante che Husserl prese da Brentano è quello dell’intenzionalità, l’idea che la coscienza sia sempre intenzionale, cioè che sia diretta ad un oggetto, che abbia un contenuto. Brentano definì l’intenzionalità come la caratteristica principale dei fenomeni psichici (o mentali), tramite cui essi possono essere distinti dai fenomeni fisici.

Ogni fenomeno mentale, ogni atto psicologico ha un contenuto, è diretto a qualche cosa (l’oggetto intenzionale). Ogni credere, desiderare, etc. ha un oggetto: il creduto, il desiderato. Brentano adopera l’espressione “inesistenza intenzionale” per indicare l'”esistenza” degli oggetti nella mente.

La riduzione fenomenologica

Husserl introduce il concetto di riduzione nelle sue lezioni del 1906/1907 (Introduzione alla Logica ed Epistemologia), e nel 1907 nelle sue cinque lezioni introduttive sull’idea della fenomenologia. In questi due cicli di lezioni Husserl pone la domanda di come sia possibile una conoscenza vera. Si tratta di indagare criticamente i fondamenti e la giustificazione della validità della conoscenza scientifica, e per fare ciò la fenomenologia dev’essere “purificata” da assunzioni e pregiudizi superflui e fuorvianti. La riduzione fenomenologica serve proprio a questo, ed il suo ruolo epistemologico viene indicato chiaramente anche dal fatto che all’inizio Husserl parlasse proprio di una “riduzione epistemologica” (Erkenntnistheoretische Reduktion).

Husserl estudou inicialmente matemática nas universidades de Leipzig (1876) e Berlin (1878), seguindo as lições de Karl Weierstrass e Leopold Kronecker. Em 1881, vai a Viena para estudar sob a direção de Leo Königsberger (antigo aluno de Weierstrass), obtendo seu doutorado em 1883, apresentando a tese Beiträge zur Variationsrechnung (« Contribuições ao calculo das variações »).

Em 1884, começa a atender as lições de Franz Brentano em filosofía na Universidade de Viena. Brentano tanto impressionou Husserl que ele prentende então dedicar sua vida à filosofia. Em 1886 Husserl vai à Universidade de Halle, recomendado por Brentano para Carl Stumpf para sua habilitação. Sob sua direção, Husserl escreve Über den Begriff der Zahl (« Sobre o Conceito do Número », 1887) cujos arquivos fornecerão as bases de sua primeira obra importante, Philosophie der Arithmetic (“Filosofia da Aritmetica”, 1891). Nessas primeiras pesquisas, Husserl tenta combinar matemática com a filosofia empírica pela qual tinha sido iniciado em Viena. Seu objetivo central será contribuir no fornecimento de fundações sólidas para a ciência matemática. O tema de seu estudo será a análise dos processos mentais necessários para a formação do conceito de número; baseado em suas próprias análises, como nos métodos atípicos de seus professores, tentará projetar a possibilidade de uma teoria sistemática. Em relação ao ensino de Karl Weiestrass, Husserl tenta derivar a idéia de que o conceito de número se obtém por um “desconto” de certas coleções de objetos; em respeito a Brentano-Stumpf, Husserl desenvolve a distinção entre as noções de presentações próprias e impróprias. Temos uma presentação própria quando o objeto está “atualmente” presente (no campo de vista, contexto ou intuição). Imprópria (ou simbólica, como também é referida), se podemos indicá-lo somente através de signos, símbolos etc. As Investigações Lógicas, de 1901, foram interpretadas como o início da teoria simbólica dos conjuntos e suas partes, também referida como mereologia.

Outro elemento importante herdado por Brentano foi a noção de intencionalidade, que define a forma essencial dos processos mentais. Uma definição simples dirá que a principal característica da consciência é de ser sempre intencional. A consciência sempre é consciência de alguma coisa : a análise intencional e descritiva da consciência definirá as relações essenciais entre atos mentais e mundo externo. Mas, para Brentano, o objetivo fora gerar com métodos empíricos (apoiando-se na introspecção pura), um critério-chave que possa caracterizar os fenômenos psíquicos por oposto aos fenômenos físicos, distinção cujo objetivo fora legitimar uma ciência psicológica nova, e livre de preconceitos (Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, 1874). Para Brentano, todo ato mental tem seus conteúdos, caracterizados por sua direção a um objeto (“objeto intencional”). Toda crença, desejo, tem necessariamente seus objetos : o desejado, o acreditado, etc. Brentano usou da expressão “inexistência intencional” para indicar o status, na mente, dos objetos do pensamento. Com a noção de intencionalidade, o filósofo austríaco propôs um conjunto de traços que distinguiriam de maneira perfeitamente empírica os fenômenos psíquicos dos fenômenos físicos : para Brentano, fenômenos físicos não tem intencionalidade. O desenvolvimento e a crítica do conceito brentaniano aparece como o motivo permanente, central, da obra de Edmund Husserl. A principal diferença, em sua interpretação da noção de intencionalidade, aparece na crítica de seu modo in-existente (“inexistência” como existencia “interna”): a transcendência necessária da mente e do discurso, a objetividade óbvia e no entanto contraditória do porvenir científico e histórico, a objetividade radical, constituidora, da subjetividade formarão a marca do trabalho do primeiro fenomenologista, e seus elementos próprios de fascinação.

Alguns anos após a publicação de sua principal obra, as Logische Untersuchungen (Investigações Lógicas; primeira edição, 1900-1901), Husserl elaborou alguns conceitos-chave que o levaram a afirmar que para estudar a estrutura da consciência seria necessário distinguir entre o ato de consciência e o fenômeno ao qual ele é dirigido (o objeto-em-si, transcendente à consciência). O conhecimento das essências seria possível apenas se “colocamos entre parênteses” todos os pressupostos relativos à existência de um mundo externo. Este procedimento ele denominou epoché. Estes novos conceito provocaram a publicação de Ideen (Idéias) em 1913, no qual eles foram pela primeira vez incorporados, e um plano para uma segunda edição das Logische Untersuchungen.

A partir de Ideen, Husserl se concentrou nas estruturas ideais, essenciais da consciência. O problema metafísico de estabelecer a realidade material daquilo que percebemos era de pequeno interesse para Husserl (diferentemente do que ocorria quando ele tinha que defender repetidamente sua posição a respeito do idealismo transcendental, que jamais propôs a inexistência de objetos materiais reais). Husserl propôs que o mundo dos objetos e modos nos quais dirigimo-nos a eles e percebemos aqueles objetos é normalmente concebido dentro do que ele denominou “ponto de vista natural”, caracterizado por uma crença de que os objetos existem materialmente e exibem propriedades que vemos como suas emanações. Husserl propôs um modo fenomenológico radicalmente novo de observar os objetos, examinando de que forma nós, em nossos diversos modos de ser intencionalmente dirigidos a eles, de fato os “constituimos” (para distinguir da criação material de objetos ou objetos que são mero fruto da imaginação); no ponto de vista Fenomenológico, o objeto deixa de ser algo simplesmente “externo” e deixa de ser visto como fonte de indicações sobre o que ele é (um olhar que é mais explicitamente delineado pelas ciências naturais), e torna-se um agrupamento de aspectos perceptivos e funcionais que implicam um ao outro sob a idéia de um objeto particular ou “tipo”. A noção de objetos como real não é removida pela fenomenologia, mas “posta entre parênteses” como um modo pelo qual levamos em consideração os objetos em vez de uma qualidade inerente à essência de um objeto fundada na relação entre o objeto e aquele que o percebe. Para melhor entender o mundo das aparências e objetos, a Fenomenologia busca identificar os aspectos invariáveis da percepção dos objetos e empurra os atributos da realidade para o papel de atributo do que é percebido (ou um pressuposto que perpassa o modo como percebemos os objetos).

Em um período posterior, Husserl começou a se debater com as complicadas questões da intersubjetividade (especificamente, como a comunicação sobre um objeto pode ser suposta como referindo-se à mesma entidade ideal) e experimenta novos métodos para fazer entender aos seus leitores a importância da Fenomenologia para a investigação científica (especificamente para a Psicologia) e o que significa “pôr entre parênteses” a atitude natural. A Crise das Ciências Européias é o trabalho inacabado de Husserl que lida mais diretamente com estas questões. Nele, Husserl pela primeira vez busca um panorama histórico do desenvolvimento da filosofia ocidental e da ciência, enfatizando os desafios apresentados pela sua crescente (unilateral) orientação empírica e naturalista. Husserl declara que a realidade mental e espiritual possui sua própria realidade independente de qualquer base física e que a ciência do espírito (Geisteswissenschaft) deve ser estabelecida sobre um fundamento tão científico como aquele alcançado pelas ciências naturais.

Como resultado da legislação anti-semita aprovada pelos nazistas em abril de 1933, foi negado ao Professor Husserl o acesso à biblioteca de Freiburg. Seu antigo pupilo e membro do partido nazista, Martin Heidegger, comunicou a Husserl sua demissão. Heidegger (cuja filosofia Husserl considerava ser o resultado de uma compreensão incorreta dos ensinamentos e dos métodos do próprio Husserl) retirou a dedicatória a Husserl de seu mais conhecido trabalho Ser e Tempo (Sein und Zeit), quando este foi reeditado em 1941.

Em 1939, os manuscritos de Husserl, que somavam aproximadamente 40.000 páginas taquigrafadas de Gabelsberger e sua pesquisa bibliográfica completa foi clandestinamente transportada para a Bélgica e depositada em Leuven onde foram criados os Husserl-Archives. Muito do material encontrado em suas pesquisas manuscritas foi publicado na série de edições críticas Husserliana.

Jean-Paul Sartre

February 3, 2009

The Nobel Prize in Literature 1964

Biography

Jean-Paul SartreJean-Paul Sartre, (1905-1980) born in Paris in 1905, studied at the École Normale Supérieure from 1924 to 1929 and became Professor of Philosophy at Le Havre in 1931. With the help of a stipend from the Institut Français he studied in Berlin (1932) the philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. After further teaching at Le Havre, and then in Laon, he taught at the Lycée Pasteur in Paris from 1937 to 1939. Since the end of the Second World War, Sartre has been living as an independent writer.

Sartre is one of those writers for whom a determined philosophical position is the centre of their artistic being. Although drawn from many sources, for example, Husserl’s idea of a free, fully intentional consciousness and Heidegger’s existentialism, the existentialism Sartre formulated and popularized is profoundly original. Its popularity and that of its author reached a climax in the forties, and Sartre’s theoretical writings as well as his novels and plays constitute one of the main inspirational sources of modern literature. In his philosophical view atheism is taken for granted; the “loss of God” is not mourned. Man is condemned to freedom, a freedom from all authority, which he may seek to evade, distort, and deny but which he will have to face if he is to become a moral being. The meaning of man’s life is not established before his existence. Once the terrible freedom is acknowledged, man has to make this meaning himself, has to commit himself to a role in this world, has to commit his freedom. And this attempt to make oneself is futile without the “solidarity” of others.

The conclusions a writer must draw from this position were set forth in “Qu’est-ce que la littérature?” (What Is Literature?), 1948: literature is no longer an activity for itself, nor primarily descriptive of characters and situations, but is concerned with human freedom and its (and the author’s) commitment. Literature is committed; artistic creation is a moral activity.

While the publication of his early, largely psychological studies, L’Imagination (1936), Esquisse d’une théorie des émotions (Outline of a Theory of the Emotions), 1939, and L’Imaginaire: psychologie phénoménologique de l’imagination (The Psychology of Imagination), 1940, remained relatively unnoticed, Sartre’s first novel, La Nausée (Nausea), 1938, and the collection of stories Le Mur (The Wall and other Stories), 1938, brought him immediate recognition and success. They dramatically express Sartre’s early existentialist themes of alienation and commitment, and of salvation through art.

His central philosophical work, L’Etre et le néant (Being and Nothingness), 1943, is a massive structuralization of his concept of being, from which much of modern existentialism derives. The existentialist humanism which Sartre propagates in his popular essay L’Existentialisme est un humanisme (Existentialism is a Humanism), 1946, can be glimpsed in the series of novels, Les Chemins de la Liberté (The Roads to Freedom), 1945-49.

Sartre is perhaps best known as a playwright. In Les Mouches (The Flies), 1943, the young killer’s committed freedom is pitted against the powerless Jupiter, while in Huis Clos (No Exit), 1947, hell emerges as the togetherness of people.

Sartre has engaged extensively in literary critisicm and has written studies on Baudelaire (1947) and Jean Genet (1952). A biography of his childhood, Les Mots (The Words), appeared in 1964.

From Nobel Lectures, Literature 1901-1967, Editor Horst Frenz, Elsevier Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1969

This autobiography/biography was first published in the book series Les Prix Nobel. It was later edited and republished in Nobel Lectures. To cite this document, always state the source as shown above.

Jean-Paul Sartre died on April 15, 1980.

Copyright © The Nobel Foundation 1964